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Holy Cows and Constitutional Nationalism in Nepal
The way in which the Nepali state has framed over the centuries the legal 
framework protecting the cow—Hinduism’s sacred animal—illuminates 
the intimate relationship between state-framed nation-building and the 
management of sociocultural diversity in Nepal, the only other Hindu-majority 
state in the world alongside India. Nepal’s 2015 Constitution, while declaring 
the state secular, continues to grant Hinduism a privileged place and to define 
the cow as Nepal’s national animal. To understand the symbolic significance of 
these constitutional provisions in the construction of the Nepali nation and their 
material impact on Nepal’s marginalized groups, it is crucial to analyze their 
historical development and their relationship to other parts of the constitution 
and to ordinary laws criminalizing cow slaughter. This article argues that cow 
protection has come to signify a vision of state authority that privileges the 
symbols of the majority over the rights of the minority—a vision channeled 
through the coercive instrument of law.
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This article investigates the existing relationship in Nepal between the enduring constitutional depiction of the cow as “the national animal,” the centuries-old 
criminalization of cow slaughter, and the centrality of Hinduism in the country’s 
process of nation-building. The analysis of the legal protection of the cow—
Hinduism’s sacred animal—is a prism through which I examine Nepal’s historical 
tensions between national integration and sociocultural diversity. This study 
thus probes into the processes of state formation and nation-building under the 
legitimizing umbrella of the Shah Hindu monarchy in one of the few Asian countries 
that was never colonized. It also examines the strategies deployed by the Nepali state 
to manage sociocultural diversity since the creation of modern Nepal in the late 
eighteenth century. I argue that the legal treatment of the cow offers key insights 
into the development of Nepal’s constitutional identity, the ongoing struggles over 
the meaning of secularism vis-à-vis the notion of hindutva (Hindu-ness), and the 
implications of majoritarian politics for the country.
Nepal’s long awaited but embattled new Constitution (the country’s seventh) was 
promulgated on September 20, 2015—nine years after the end of the Maoist insurgency 
(1996–2006). This document was originally expected to complete the peace process, 
“build a New Nepal,” and act as a beacon of social inclusion. However, Madhesi and 
Janajati groups have responded to the promulgation of the new constitution with 
growing anger, leading to ongoing protests in the southern plains of the Terai region 
bordering India. These groups contend that the document discriminates against 
them in the areas of federal demarcation, electoral representation, citizenship, and 
the privileged position of Hinduism (Bell 2015). In the document itself, alongside 
a textual commitment to secularism, the new constitution backtracks from the 
previous 2007 interim document and grants Hinduism special protection (article 
4), while continuing to define the cow as Nepal’s national animal (article 9) and to 
feature a ban on religious conversion (article 26). This article seeks to understand 
the symbolic significance of these constitutional provisions in the construction of 
the Nepali nation and their material implications for those who do not subscribe 
to this version of Hindu orthodoxy. To do so the analysis focuses on the historical 
development of cow protection and its relationship to other parts of the constitution 
and to ordinary laws, together with the judicial interpretation of these provisos. 
In particular, special emphasis is placed on the link between Nepal’s constitutional 
arrangements and the longstanding criminalization of cow slaughter in the “old” 
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(1854), and the “new” (1963) Muluki Ain (Country Code), and the new Penal Code 
of 2018. These provisions—unlike in India—apply uniformly across Nepal’s entire 
territory and make no exceptions on the basis of community affiliation.
Ultimately, the article concentrates on the role of Hinduism in defining and 
legitimizing state authority. Religion and its symbols (including the cow) are deployed 
as essential components of Nepal’s state ideology. The traditional ritual focus on 
purity is transposed through legal means to the political sphere in the modern 
setting of the nation state. Thus, the analysis investigates the historical development 
and implementation of the constitutional provisions defining the state, nation, 
monarchy, national symbols, and the right to religion. Then the article examines the 
links among these constitutional provisions and their relationship to the wider legal 
system. This offers an instrumental reading of cow protection in Nepal, arguing that 
these legal measures are primarily aimed at legitimizing political authority and the 
coercive powers of the state, while reinforcing Nepal’s social hierarchy.
The present study is based on two premises. First, constitutions matter, and 
constitutional texts and structures both enable and set (more or less effective) 
limits to political conduct. Second, the prima facie distinction between symbolic and 
substantive aspects of the constitutional text is spurious with regard to subsequent 
interpretation and implementation. The dominant scholarly view counsels caution in 
adopting the method of expressivism, which treats constitutions as direct expressions 
of a nation’s identity (Jacobsohn 2010, 12; Tushnet 2006, 68). In this respect, the 
concept of constitutional identity is deployed to evaluate the role of Hinduism and its 
symbols (including the cow) in Nepal’s constitutional developments. Gary Jacobsohn 
argues that,
a constitution acquires an identity through experience. . . . Identity emerges dia-
logically and represents a mix of political aspirations and commitments that are 
expressive of a nation’s past, as well as the determination of those within the soci-
ety who seek in some ways to transcend that past. It is changeable but resistant to 
its own destruction. (2010, 7)
While the constitutional understanding offered by expressivist interpretative 
methods may yield a static view of constitutional identity, it is not irrelevant. In this 
respect, Jacobsohn also proposes a dialogical intermediate position:
I argue for a more fluid concept of identity, in which constitutional assertions of 
self-identity are part of an ongoing process entailing adaptation and adjustment as 
circumstances dictate. It is not fluidity without boundaries, however, and textual 
commitments such as are embodied in Preambles often set the topography upon 
which the mapping of constitutional identity occurs. (2010, 13)
The study of cow protection in Nepal reveals the profound and unresolved 
tensions between an “acquiescent constitutionalism,” namely constitutional 
drafting, interpretation, and implementation intended to conform with the 
general configuration of the society (Jacobsohn 2010, 11), and a “transformative 
constitutionalism,” whereby the express purpose of the constitution is to separate 
the future from the past in ways that will have transformative effects on social 
behavior (Jacobsohn 2010, 10). While they are both “adaptive processes” seeking 
96 | Asian Ethnology 80/1 • 2021
to “adjust constitutional identity to shifting facts on the ground,” their interplay 
in Nepal discloses the prevalence of acquiescence and the predilection for path-
dependent continuities and self-reinforcing patterns of social exclusion legitimized 
and enforced by legal means.
Looking across the border: Nepal and India compared
The bordering nations of Nepal and India are the only two countries in the world 
where the overwhelming majority of the population are followers of Hinduism. In 
Nepal, according to the 2011 Census, 81.3 percent of the total population is Hindu 
(Government of Nepal 2011), while in India the 2011 Census recorded 79.8 percent 
(Government of India 2011). Nonetheless, Hinduism in India and Nepal—very much 
like Islam in Pakistan—cannot be regarded as a blanket marker of sociocultural 
homogeneity, as profound differences exist within this Hindu majority. In fact, both 
countries feature a great degree of sociocultural diversity in terms of caste, ethnicity, 
language, sect, region, class, ideology, gender, and sexuality—identity markers that 
have often acquired political salience regardless of the common “Hindu banner.”1 
Moreover, in both countries roughly 20 percent of the population is not Hindu. 
For instance, India’s Muslims constitute approximately 14.2 percent of the entire 
population, namely about 170 million people, making India the country with the 
third largest Muslim population in the world. It is in this historical context of deep 
pluralism and politicized identities that the legal protection of the cow as Hinduism’s 
sacred animal and the meaning of secularism ought to be framed and understood.
While my article focuses on Nepal, a comparison with India brings into sharper 
focus the embattled relationship among secularism, the legal treatment of religious 
matters (such as cow protection), and the constitutional framing of national identity 
in both countries. The comparison between Nepal and India with regard to the legal 
treatment of the religious and cultural identity markers of the Hindu majority is 
important for two sets of reasons. First, from a historical perspective, Nepal’s national 
identity has been forged in binary opposition to India since the eighteenth century, 
particularly with regard to Nepal’s claim of having retained its status of a “true Hindu 
Kingdom,” while India had been “polluted” by waves of invasions that resulted in the 
installation of non-Hindu rulers, first the Muslims and then the Christians. Second, 
from a legal perspective, India is the jurisdiction that has singlehandedly influenced 
Nepal’s legal developments the most, from the emulation of the various bouts of legal 
codification in the nineteenth century to the adoption of public interest litigation in 
the early 1990s.
Significantly, both of the current constitutions of India (1950) and Nepal (2015) 
now define the state as secular but do grant a privileged position to the cow, even if 
the link between the cow and Hinduism is not explicit in either document. However, 
it is important to highlight that the respective constitutional commitments to 
secularism and modalities of cow protection in India and Nepal have emerged 
from radically different historical and political trajectories. As John Breuilly (1993, 
1) argued, “nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics and politics is 
about power. Power, in the modern world, is principally about control of the state.” 
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As a result, nationalism is about obtaining and using state power. While Nepal is an 
example of “state-framed nationalism” (Brubaker 1999) deployed by political leaders 
to consolidate their grasp on state power, India instead represents an instance 
of “oppositional anti-colonial nationalism,” where the creation of a nationalist 
movement sought to seize power from the British colonizers and appropriate the 
colonial state. These different historical trajectories are clearly reflected in India and 
Nepal’s constitution-making processes and constitutional outcomes.
In India, secularism was a tool for nation-building, to bring together the many 
diverse groups that form Indian society after the success of the anticolonial movement 
(Bajpai 2011, 94–96). This strategy reflected the All-India National Congress’s 
longstanding viewpoint that the people of India were Indians irrespective of their 
religion—the idea at the core of the Indian national liberation struggle and a key pillar 
of state-building, which was formulated in stark opposition to the notion of Pakistan 
as the homeland for Indian Muslims (Austin 1966, 4). As a result, the Constitution 
remained neutral toward the various religions practiced in the country and did not 
feature any ethno-cultural characterization of the nation. At the same time, the term 
“secular” did not appear anywhere in the document. In the 1973 Kesavananda Bharati 
case, however, Chief Justice Sikri stated in his opinion that secularism is one of the 
five pillars of the Indian Constitution’s basic structure.2 Ironically, India’s explicit 
constitutional commitment to secularism took place only in 1976 during Indira 
Gandhi’s emergency with the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, which Granville 
Austin (1999, 370–90) characterized as “sacrificing democracy to power.” While 
the 42nd Amendment was later repealed almost in its entirety, the insertion of the 
adjective “secular” in the preamble endured.
India’s Constitution deals with the issue of cow protection in article 48 on animal 
husbandry, which encourages the preservation of cows, calves, and milch and 
draught cattle. The proviso was placed in the chapter on the directive principles of 
state policy, which is not enforceable in a court of law. Notably, the framers of the 
Constitution couched the protection of Hinduism’s sacred animal in the modernist 
language of science, not in religious terms. The legal battle over cow protection then 
shifted to the State legislatures and the courts, which have historically struggled 
to reconcile majoritarian religious demands with the protection of minorities, in a 
legal discourse unable to disentangle pseudo-scientific arguments for improving 
stockbreeding from essentially communal majoritarian politics.
At the time of Independence, India retained the British colonial legal system and 
judicial structure almost intact. This included the personal law systems under which 
the domains of family, inheritance, and succession law are regulated separately for 
the Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Parsi communities on the basis of their respective 
religious laws. Significantly, Hindu law also applies to the Buddhist, Jain, and Sikh 
communities.3 Criminal law, instead, has been regulated through uniform legislation 
since colonial times, when the most important statute was introduced, the Indian 
Penal Code 1860. The wave of Hindu revivalism in British India in the late nineteenth 
century led to the formation of the Cow Protection Society in 1882. In this context, 
Anthony Parel (1969, 182) argued that the cow became the political symbol of the 
Hindu Right’s version of Indian nationalism. After independence, constitution-
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makers decided to leave the regulation of cow slaughter to the State legislatures 
(article 246; schedule 7, list II, entry 15), and the majority of Indian States now feature 
a partial or complete ban on cow slaughter. India, however, has witnessed a number 
of failed attempts by the Hindu Right to introduce a nation-wide ban (Chigateri 2012 
140). The electoral success of the Hindu Right in the 2014 general elections has led to 
a disquieting rise in communal violence, and a number of incidents revolve around 
the issue of cow protection and have taken on clear anti-Muslim and anti-Dalit 
communal forms.4
Nepal, unlike India, was never colonized, and its creation as the modern state 
entity we know today resulted from the late-eighteenth-century military campaigns 
of King Prithvi Narayan Shah of Gorkha, who vowed to make Nepal into “a true 
Hindustan.” As a result, the processes of state- and nation-building pivoted around 
the assertion of the authority of the Hindu monarch to legitimize his rule over the 
conquered territories as the upholder of the dhārmik (cosmic) order, also through the 
protection of cows (Michaels 1997). Since the late 1950s during Nepal’s first bout of 
democratization, the country’s constitutions reflected this ethno-cultural vision of 
the Nepali nation as “a pure Hindu Kingdom” based upon the notions of Hinduism, 
Hindu monarchy, and the Nepali language (Onta 1996)—a way of imagining the 
Nepali nation that has developed over the centuries in opposition to India. From the 
1959 constitution, through the 1962 Panchayat constitution, and up until the 1990 
democratic constitution, Hinduism held a privileged position in the document, while 
the cow was institutionalized as the national animal, and freedom of religion was 
limited to religion as “handed down since ancient times,” which was accompanied by a 
constitutional ban on proselytism. While the post–civil war 2007 interim constitution 
marked a radical break with the country’s constitutional past by declaring Nepal a 
secular state and severing the ties with the Shah monarchy, the restricted right to 
religion and the cow as the national animal endured. The 2015 constitution took a 
step back from 2007. While declaring the state as “secular,” the document granted 
special protection to Hinduism (sanātana) and preserved the cow as Nepal’s national 
animal alongside a limited right to religion.
Unlike India, Nepal features a uniform legal system. As discussed in greater 
detail in the following paragraphs, the promulgation of the Muluki Ain in 1854 
introduced a uniform legal code spanning civil and criminal law provisions designed 
to impose a single caste hierarchy across the country and slot the many conquered 
groups, whether Hindu or not, into a single “national hierarchy.” Chapter 66 of the 
Ain provided that the offence of intentionally killing a cow carried a mandatory 
sentence of life imprisonment (Höfer 1979, 204). In 1963, a new version of the Ain was 
issued, and it remained the backbone of Nepal’s legal system until 2018, when new 
separate versions of the Penal Code and the Civil Code were introduced. Chapter 7 
on quadrupeds in part 4 of the 1963 Muluki Ain retained the criminalization of cow 
slaughter, but the sentence for intentionally killing a cow was reduced to twelve-year 
imprisonment. Similarly, Section 289 of the new Penal Code further reduced it to 
three-year imprisonment.
The analysis of the modalities and concomitants of cow protection by legal 
means in India and Nepal illuminates comparative constitutional law debates over 
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constitutional identity and communal majoritarianism directed both at disciplining 
the Hindu majority and dominating the non-Hindu minorities. The position of 
Hinduism as the majority religion in the constitutional frameworks of India and Nepal 
and its relation to competing visions of the nation have been the object of intense 
political and legal struggle for decades in both countries. However, the electoral 
success of the Hindu Right at the center in India in 2014 and 2019—together with 
a disquieting rise in communal violence often associated with cow protection—and 
the promulgation of Nepal’s long-awaited but extremely embattled new constitution 
in September 2015 have reignited debates about the place of Hinduism in their 
constitutional systems. The recent waves of Hindu revivalism in India and Nepal call 
for profound reflections on the intimate relationship between the role of religion 
in constitutional documents and the treatment of sociocultural difference in both 
jurisdictions. In this respect, the thorny issue of cow protection is a useful prism to 
analyze legal responses to the surge in ethno-cultural majoritarian demands in both 
jurisdictions aimed at erasing difference and nonconformity. These renewed efforts 
to enforce the rules of cow protection both by legal and extralegal coercive means in 
India and Nepal have come to symbolize the increasingly violent attempts to impose 
a nation-wide uniform, majoritarian, hegemonic, and communal ideology on those 
who do not subscribe to it, either by choice or by birth.
Cow protection and the law in Nepal
Nepal was never colonized. As a result, the Nepali state has played a central role in 
the construction of the Nepali nation since the creation of modern Nepal through the 
military conquests of King Prithvi Narayan Shah in the late eighteenth century and 
his successors. In this respect, the dynastic continuity of the Shah monarchy, which 
lasted uninterrupted for over two centuries until Nepal was proclaimed a republic on 
May 28, 2008 by the first Constituent Assembly, was pivotal to the construction and 
legitimization of political authority in the country. I argue that the centrality of the 
Shah Hindu king in Nepal’s governmental arrangements shaped the modalities of the 
legitimization of political authority even after the demise of the monarchy. In this 
respect, law fulfilled a crucial function in crafting, disseminating, and imposing an 
authoritative version of “Nepaliness.”
Nepal’s foundations: The Shah (1769–1846) and Rana (1846–1951) periods
King Prithvi Narayan Shah of Gorkha, a small kingdom lying westward of the 
Kathmandu Valley, initiated a series of military campaigns to expand Gorkhali 
sovereignty to the many petty kingdoms in the middle Himalayan range. Prithvi 
Narayan’s successors continued the territorial conquests up until the Gorkhali 
defeat by the East India Company in the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814–1816). Therefore, 
the legitimation of political authority in the newly created state revolved around 
the symbolism and mystique of the Shah Hindu monarchy. Prithvi Narayan Shah 
envisioned the transformation of his extended realm into “a garden of all sorts of 
people” (sabāī jātko phulbāri), an “asal hindusthān, a true Hindu kingdom of the four 
varṇas and thirty-six castes” (Stiller 1968, 44). The concept of a “true Hindu kingdom” 
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implied a contraposition to an “untrue” or “polluted” Hindu kingdom, which 
was India. Writing in 1774, Prithvi Narayan Shah referred to India as “Mughlana” 
following the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate, and later on of the Mughal Empire. 
The formation of Muslim kingdoms in the Gangetic plains, the defeat of Hindu rulers, 
and the migration of Hindu chieftains toward the shelter offered by the Himalayas all 
gave to the “Hindu category” a specific raison d’être in the Himalayan region that was 
to become the modern state of Nepal.
Hinduism’s ritual dichotomy of “purity/impurity” progressively acquired a clearly 
political connotation in Nepal. It was not the presence of non-Hindu subjects that 
undermined the “purity” and dhārmik order of a Hindu kingdom but rather having a 
non-Hindu ruler. Hinduism then became politically instrumental to the Shah kings to 
portray themselves as a “civilizing center” in the eyes of the conquered people and 
an “uncontaminated and culturally distinct periphery” vis-à-vis its Indian neighbor 
to the south (Burghart 1996, 263). For the Shah king it was of crucial importance to 
safeguard the ritual purity of his kingdom, and in this respect cow protection played 
a central role in upholding the dhārmik order. For instance, Prithvi Narayan’s political 
testament—the Divya Upadeś (Divine Message)—records the reasons by which he was 
entitled to rule over Nepal:
[Two astrologers to Prithvi Narayan Shah]: You, oh Prince, have held at all times 
great respect for cows (gau), Brahmins, guests, holy men, gods, goddesses. Also, in 
your hands lies the blessing of Saraswati. You will one day be King of Nepal. (Stiller 
1968, 39)
These coordinates established the rightful political authority of the government, 
and cow protection featured prominently in this conceptualization. While there is 
evidence of earlier measures to preserve pasture for cows, it was only in 1805 that 
King Rana Bahadur Shah introduced Nepal’s first ban on cow slaughter by royal edict 
(Michaels 1997, 82–86). The order stated:
From today killing cows is prohibited. Inform (everybody) that, if somebody does 
(cow slaughter), capital punishment will take place and his property will be confis-
cated. (Michaels 1997, 86)
In the first half of the nineteenth century, new orders were issued with regard to 
the slaughter of oxen, yaks, and crossbreeds of cows and yaks, and the taxation of 
communities that consumed sinu (i.e., the carcasses of cattle; Michaels 1997, 87–89). 
It was not just a matter of preserving the life of cows; the command of the king 
extended to the consumption and use of cow meat and parts by his subjects.
Prime Minister Jang Bahadur Rana eventually consolidated all these rules in the 
1854 uniform legal code known as the Muluki Ain. After years of factional politics, 
in 1846 a young aristocrat, Jang Bahadur Kunwar, emerged as Nepal’s undisputed 
leader. He inaugurated a new phase of Nepali history and devised a different political 
regime for the kingdom. Jang Bahadur made the office of prime minister hereditary 
within his family, assumed the regal title “Rana” to allow intermarriage with the 
royal family, and effectively neutralized the power of the Shah king (Whelpton 
1991, 187). Jang Bahadur also elected not to supplant the Shah monarchy, however, 
and retained the king as the living symbol of the unity of the Nepali state. Thus, 
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the legitimation of political power in Nepal remained anchored in the ideology of 
Hindu kingship. Jang Bahadur even reinforced the aura of sanctity of the monarch to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the new regime as well as to further isolate and control 
the king by preventing any direct contact with the population (Rose and Fisher 1970, 
37). The Ranas continued to use Hinduism to legitimize their political authority but in 
a different manner from the previous Shah period. Under the Ranas the relationship 
between Hinduism and state authority acquired a modern connotation: “Jang 
Bahadur, like Prithvi Narayan Shah, argued that Hindu rulership was a precondition 
of achieving a real Hindustan. Unlike Prithvi Narayan, however, Jang Bahadur did not 
aim to make an authentic Hindustan in a subcontinent of less authentic ones. Rather 
he sought to protect the world’s only Hindu kingdom” (Burghart 1996, 270–71).
Hinduism was also central to the efforts to integrate the different ethnolinguistic 
groups under Nepali sovereignty, and the law became a crucial instrument to do 
so. The process of “Hinduization” of the many communities living in Nepal took 
place both by their bottom-up emulation of upper-caste Brahminical sociocultural 
practices—essentially what Mysore Narasimhachar Srinivas (1952, 32) had described 
as Sanskritization—and by top-down imposition by the State. This article solely 
focuses on the second aspect of the process. The means by which such Hinduization 
was enforced by the Rana rulers also presented starkly modern features. The most 
important example of this strategy was the attempt at modern legal codification 
inspired by the British and French. In fact, in 1850 Jang Bahadur crossed the “dark 
water” and became the first high-caste Hindu political leader to visit Europe. He 
went on a journey to England and France as ambassador of King Surendra Shah 
and was immensely impressed by the wealth and organizational structure of the 
European nations. In 1851, when Jang Bahadur returned to Nepal, he brought back 
with him the belief that modern law was an essential tool of effective governance, 
and a manifestation of Western hegemony. In fact, the Ain has been regarded as the 
result of the impression that the Code Napoléon—and the French Emperor—made on 
him (Whelpton 1991, 218). Jang Bahadur’s travel diary Belāit Yātrā (Foreign Journey) 
records his understanding of law and politics in Europe:
After due consideration, the state has also to instruct and educate everyone, 
including the King, the nobles, the common people, the army, foreigners, travel-
ers, orphans, the ignorant, the delinquent and the unfortunate. It has to proclaim, 
teach, educate and give instructions concerning the constitution (rājnītiko ain, liter-
ally “the law of politics”). (Whelpton 1983, 185–86)
The importance placed on the law in constituting the polity is reflected in Jang 
Bahadur’s promulgation of the Ain in 1854.
The Muluki Ain was a legal document codifying traditional social conditions, 
subsuming the various ethnic groups within the Parbatiya Hindu caste hierarchy, 
and imposing its rules on them. According to Andras Höfer (1979, 41), the sources 
of Nepal’s first legal code were the dharmaśāstra (the traditional Hindu legal texts), 
the arthaśāstra, Mughal legislation, and possibly Anglo-Indian law. The provisions of 
the Ain were more or less limited to the fields of personal and administrative law 
(Höfer 1979, 40). However, the scope of the Ain went beyond the attempt to simply 
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impose homogeneous socio-legal norms on the entire population under Nepali 
sovereignty; the process of codification had a clear political rationale. The code was 
informed by two ideas: the South Asian concept of a “pure Hindu country” where 
dhārmik order and collective purity are protected by law, and the Western idea of 
the nation state. Ultimately, the 1854 code attempted to legitimize Nepal’s political 
identity and promote national integration vis-à-vis the menace posed by British and 
Chinese expansionism. Moreover, by claiming to be a piece of legislation applicable 
to Nepal’s entire population, the Ain represented the first attempt at legal uniformity 
made by the Nepali state and thus an initial stage in the process of state-building. 
In this respect, Mahesh Chandra Regmi (1975, 110) claimed that the Ain had a quasi-
constitutional function. The integration of different social groups through uniform 
legislation into a single Hindu hierarchy was aimed at devising a top-down policy of 
homogenization of the various communities inhabiting the country. The raison d’être 
of the code is clearly stated in the preamble:
In the Kaliyuga this kingdom is the only kingdom in the world where cows, women, 
and Brahmans may not be killed. (Michaels 1997, 80)
The cow played a pivotal role in ensuring the ritual purity of the realm, and its 
protection corresponded to the extension of royal sovereignty over the territories 
within the boundaries of the Nepali state. Chapter 66 of the Ain on cow protection 
provided as follows:
1.  If a cow has been killed with intent, the offender is to be punished with life 
imprisonment.
2.  Whoever injures a cow deliberately with a weapon, is to be punished by confis-
cating his property or by reducing him to slavery, according to his caste groups.
3.  Whoever kills a cow unintentionally when driving the animal to pasture, etc, 
obtains absolution after paying a fine of R 1. . . .
5.  Whoever witnesses the killing of a cow and fails to report it to the authorities, is 
fined Rs 50.
6.  Whoever beats a cow until it bleeds is to be fined Rs 2. If the cow or water buffa-
lo’s leg is broken, the fine amounts to Rs 10.
7.  If someone killed a cow with intent and is thereupon killed himself, his murderer 
will not be punished. However, he will be punishable as an ordinary murderer if 
it is proved that the killer of the cow acted unintentionally.
8.  Exempt from punishment is an injury of a sick cow, necessitated by an operation: 
sawing off the horns, removal of insects from a wound, etc. . . .
13.  If a cow tied up in the cowshed perishes due to an illness or accident, such as 
lightening, fire or attack, its owner obtains absolution after payment of a fee.
14.  An imbecile person who injures a cow with a weapon, a stick or by throwing 
stones at it obtains absolution after receiving ten lashes of the whip. (Höfer 1979, 
204–5)
Chapter 66 contains a number of exceptions, because it effectively sought to 
balance the fact that the cow is both a holy and a working animal (Michaels 1997, 91).
The Rana regime was also confronted with the difficult issue of enforcing the rules 
of the Ain in the more remote mountainous areas of the country. Often the rules of 
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cow protection clashed with local customs as many ethnic groups, whether Hindu or 
not, had longstanding traditions of using cattle meat for rituals and/or consumption 
(Campbell 1997; Shneiderman 2015). Axel Michaels (1997, 81) argues that the cow 
as a symbol of the king’s political authority over various ethnic groups and remote 
areas had both an integrative and disintegrative role. I respectfully disagree on the 
“integrative” aspect of the process as distinguished from coercion. While there was 
a slow process of Sanskritization, in which the Nepali state by and large did not 
impose cultural practices on its subjects but rather led by example (Gellner 2005, 
1), the imposition of a ban on cow slaughter was a clear exception to this approach 
and a manifest instance of the exercise of coercive state power through law. The 
Ain, however, also recognized the existence of custom and made an exception to the 
restrictions on killing animals (aside from cattle) “for certain holidays and particular 
occasions, in the course of which, following old traditions, animal sacrifices must be 
performed” (Höfer 1979, 205). The legal regulation of animal treatment is part of the 
efforts by the rulers to exercise their authority uniformly throughout the country. 
Importantly, the regulation of cow slaughter in the Ain seeks “mainly to protect the 
life and holiness of the cow for the sake of the king’s Hindu orthodoxy and for the 
sake of a common state ideology (as insisted upon by the rulers), but not for the sake 
of the animal itself. This has nothing to do with the protection of animals, or with 
ahimsa (non-violence) or vegetarianism” (Michaels 1997, 91).
Nepal’s first democratic experiment (1951–1960)
The Rana regime could not withstand the democratic pressures stemming from 
the success of the anticolonial movement in India, and in 1951 an alliance of King 
Tribhuvan Shah with the Nepali underground political parties that had formed in India 
succeeded in toppling the Rana regime. After a short time, an interim constitution 
was promulgated in 1951, and negotiations between the king and the political 
parties began with regard to the drafting of the permanent document. In 1951, King 
Tribhuvan promised that the new constitution would be drafted by a Constituent 
Assembly (Tripathi 2002, 25). However, his untimely death and the succession to the 
throne of his son Mahendra effectively put an end to that disposition.
The new king became progressively more active in political matters and sought 
to exercise his authority in accordance with Hindu traditions (Dhungel et al. 1998, 
24). As a result, King Mahendra continued to ignore demands for the creation of a 
Constituent Assembly and postponed general elections twice. Then, in early 1958, 
Mahendra made a resolute move and invited British constitutional expert Sir Ivor 
Jennings to guide the impending constitution-making process (Malagodi 2016). On 
February 1, 1958, the king issued a Royal Proclamation to serve as the roadmap for 
Nepal’s constitution-making process and blamed the lack of progress and Nepal’s 
political instability on the political parties (Joshi and Rose 1966, 212–14). He also 
announced the establishment of a five-member Constitution Drafting Commission 
to prepare a new document, which was to form the basis for holding the elections 
of a bicameral parliament. The emphasis placed by the king on the importance of 
preserving Nepal’s national unity implied that the Shah monarchy was to play 
a central role in the new constitutional edifice. The new constitution was to be 
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centered on the monarchy operating through a parliamentary system of government 
within a unitary state.
Jennings completed his work in Nepal in late April 1958; soon afterward the Cabinet 
approved the draft constitution and submitted it to King Mahendra for promulgation. 
The king, however, took over eight months to revise the document and promulgated 
it on February 12, 1959—only a week before the general elections, leaving the political 
parties unable to put forward any meaningful opposition to the new constitution. The 
frame of government adopted reflected Jennings’s work: the document nominally 
established a democratically elected parliamentary system under a constitutional 
monarchy, while the king retained de facto ultimate sovereignty. The monarch 
enjoyed wide discretionary powers and was granted residuary and emergency 
powers. A perusal of Jennings’s third draft reveals that substantive additions were 
made to the text in the revision phase, most likely by the king and his entourage, 
with regard to the ethno-cultural elements of the document and the use of Hinduism 
to legitimize the king’s political authority.5 In particular, the clauses pertaining to the 
Shah monarchy were expanded to include extensive cultural, religious, and historical 
references supporting the Shah monarchy. The preamble and article 1 defined His 
Majesty, for the first time in a Nepali Constitution, as “a descendant of the illustrious 
King Prithvi Narayan Shah, adherent of the Aryan culture and Hindu religion,” and 
stated that the sovereign powers of the Kingdom of Nepal were vested in the king “in 
accordance with the traditions and customs of our country and which devolved on Us 
from Our August and Respected Forefathers.”
For the first time in Nepal’s constitutional history the notion of Hindu kingship 
was institutionalized in positivist legal form at the constitutional level. The symbolic 
elements used to characterize the Shah monarch were matched by material 
restrictions on religious freedom under article 5 in the chapter on fundamental 
rights. The freedom of religion was limited by the definition of religion “as handed 
down from ancient times (rākhī sanātana dekhi).” Significantly, the term sanātana was 
employed to characterize religion. Sanātana dharma (eternal duty) is the Sanskrit 
expression originally found in the Vedas, then promoted in nineteenth-century 
colonial India by revivalist Hindu movements, to define Hinduism in autochthonous 
terms (the word “Hindu” is instead of Persian origins). During the development 
of organized Hinduism in late colonial times, the term sanātana dharma became 
a symbol of the orthodox approach to Hinduism adopted by organizations such as 
the Sanatana Dharma Sabha, in contrast to the sociopolitical attitude espoused by 
reformist movements such as the Arya Samaj. Later in the 1920s the notion “sanātana 
dharma” formed the ideological basis for the creation of the Hindu nationalist 
organizations under the rightwing hindutva umbrella, such as the Hindu Mahasabha 
(Zavos 2001, 121). Nepal’s institutional turn toward the symbolism of this modern 
version of orthodox Hinduism entailed patrolling and protecting the identity of the 
world’s last Hindu kingdom. As a result, article 5 also provided that “no person shall 
be entitled to convert another person to his religion,” placing constitutional limits 
on proselytization in view of limiting the expansion of Christianity and Islam and 
protecting the “Hindu-ness” of the Nepali state.
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The deployment of ethno-national symbols couched in the language of orthodox 
Hinduism in the 1959 constitution is a clear attempt to legitimize the hegemonic 
position of the Shah monarchy in the constitutional edifice. While the new 
dispensation claimed to institute a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary 
form of government through a “modified Westminster model,” the extent of those 
“modifications” was such that constitutional restraints on unelected executive 
power had become almost entirely meaningless. Ultimately, the emphasis on the 
Hindu character and cultural traditions of the Shah monarchy was inserted to 
distract from—and to justify—the democratic deficit in the new constitution’s frame 
of government.
Nepal’s monarchical panchayat autocracy (1960–1990)
In 1960, King Mahendra effectively staged a royal coup: he assumed emergency 
powers, banned all political parties, and suspended the short-lived 1959 constitution. 
He sought to engineer a brand-new political regime, the Panchayat system, nominally 
based on Nepal’s traditions as the country’s alternative route to modernization 
and development (Burghart 1993, 1). After holding absolute power for two years, 
on December 16, 1962, King Mahendra promulgated a new constitution. The 1962 
document established the involvement of the king in every branch of the government, 
making the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the constitution entirely 
meaningless (Dhungel et al. 1998, 30). The active leadership of the king in the 
Panchayat system entailed a complete absence of political opposition, warranted by 
the outlawing of all political parties.
The autocratic position of the Shah king in the constitutional edifice was 
legitimized through the deployment of a full-blown ethno-cultural nationalist 
ideology centered on Hinduism, the dynastic continuity of the Shah monarchy, and 
the Nepali language (Onta 1996). For the first time in Nepal’s constitutional history, 
article 3 declared Nepal to be a Hindu kingdom, and article 6(2) introduced a number 
of “national symbols,” which included the cow (gāī) as Nepal’s national animal. The 
1962 document retained the connotations of His Majesty as “a descendant of King 
Prithvi Narayan Shah and adherent of Aryan culture and Hindu religion” in article 
20(1). The right to religion under article 14 was again limited. It defined “religion 
as handed down from ancient times” (rākhī sanātana dekhi) and preserved the ban 
on proselytization. Thus, the emphasis on Nepali traditions became part of the 
propagandistic rhetoric of the Panchayat system. The 1962 constitution was imbued 
with the spirit of modern nation-building, which was, Mahendra believed, the ideal 
strategy to tighten his hold on power and create favorable circumstances for Nepal’s 
socioeconomic development and modernization. Moreover, the new document fixed 
the coordinates for the construction of a Nepalese nationalistic discourse: Hinduism, 
the Shah monarchy, and the Nepali language became the “triumvirate of official 
Nepali national culture” (Onta 1996, 214).
In 1963, as part of his modernizing efforts King Mahendra promulgated a new 
Muluki Ain, with significant departures from the 1854 document. The new code 
constituted the keystone of Nepal’s civil and criminal law system until 2018. In Nepal 
there is no personal laws system like that which exists in India, and the provisions of 
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the Ain are meant to apply to all the citizens of Nepal, irrespective of their religious 
affiliation. The new code remained anchored in Hindu values and sources, although 
discrimination on the basis of caste or ethnicity was formally abolished. As Höfer 
(1979, 204) further explains, contrary to the widespread view, modern legislation has 
not explicitly abolished the caste hierarchy. Although there is no longer an inequality 
before the law, based on caste affiliation, the system of relations constituting the 
caste hierarchy remains unchanged and is tacitly sanctioned.
Significantly, the first line of the preamble of the new code states that the śāstras 
represent an influence on the customs practiced in Nepal. The reference to Hindu 
legal sources is less direct in the new code but not the influence of Hindu principles, 
rules, and Weltanschauung.
This approach is clearly reflected in the modern criminalization of proselytism 
contained in the Ain. Section 1 of chapter 19 in part 4 on “Decency” (adal) provides 
the following:
1.  Within Nepal, no one of the Christian, Islamic, etc. faith shall propagate his or 
her religion in such manner as to undermine Hinduism nor shall cause Hindus to 
convert to his or her religion. If a person attempts to do such an act, they shall be 
liable to imprisonment for a term of 3 years; if a person has already caused others 
to convert to another religion, they shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of 
6 years. If such person is a foreign national, he or she shall also be deported from 
Nepal after they serve their sentence. A person of the Hindu faith who converts 
to another religion shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of up to 1 year; if 
such person is a foreign national, he or she shall also be deported from Nepal 
after the service of punishment by him or her. If a person attempts to change 
their own religion they shall be liable to a fine of 100 Rupees. If conversion has 
already taken place, that person shall convert back to Hinduism (my translation).
The provision was explicit with regard to the fact that the only religion protected 
by the juridical establishment was Hinduism.
The new Ain also retained the ban on cow slaughter but reduced the sentence for 
the offence. Chapter 7 on quadrupeds provided that:
1.  No person shall, with intention to kill, kill, cause another person to kill, attempt 
to kill, a cow or ox or take a cow or ox to a foreign country or take and sell it in 
such country, with such intention. . . .
2.  Where a cow or ox happens to die as a result of a sudden strike or otherwise 
when any action is taken for rescue/welfare or when some other thing is done 
without intention to kill it, it shall be deemed an accidental death. For the pur-
pose of relieving pain on the body and, for welfare, a wound or brand may be 
made on the body or blood may be extracted from some organ. . . .
4.  Where a person sees another person being ready, by taking up a weapon or other-
wise, to intentionally kill a cow or ox, the person shall prohibit that other person 
from killing the cow or ox. Where that other person, rejecting such instruction, 
uses the weapon also against the person who so prohibits, and the person who 
strikes, cuts, and kills that other person shall not be deemed to commit offense 
and be liable to punishment. In cases other than that mentioned above, any per-
son shall not kill but shall arrest and hand over such other person to the office.
Malagodi: constitutional nationalisM in nepal | 107
5.  Where any person hits a cow or ox with a weapon, heavy stick, or stone, and as a 
result of that pain or suffering, the cow or ox cannot move, becomes confined to 
its shed, and dies within 21 days, the cow or ox shall be deemed to have died as 
a result of the wound or pain caused by that person. Where such cow or ox dies 
after the period of 21 days or dies of another illness or disease after it has started 
making movement, that person who has so hit it shall be liable to punishment 
only for the wound caused by him/her. . . .
8.  No one shall export, carry, or sell the branded bull (sandhe) or old cow or bullock 
or barren cow (baila) in a foreign country. If someone sells, the amount involved 
in the sale shall be confiscated and such a person shall also be fined at the rate of 
100 Rupees for each animal. In cases where a person is arrested in the course of 
transportation, before reaching a foreign country, he or she shall be fined at the 
rate of 50 Rupees per animal.
9.  No person shall sell or purchase a bullock (basha) or branded bull (sandhe). If 
any person so sells or purchases, the amount received from the seller shall be 
confiscated, and that person shall also be liable to punishment. If the purchaser 
purchases a bullock (basha) or branded ox (sandhe) without knowing about the 
branded mark, such a person shall not be liable to punishment. In such a case 
the buyer shall be entitled to receive the purchased amount from the seller, and 
the seller shall also be liable to punishment.
10.  Any person who transports a cow, branded bull (sandhe), or bullock (basha) from 
the territory of Nepal to a foreign country, and kills or causes another person to 
kill such an animal; he or she shall be liable to the punishment of imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 6 years.
11.  If a person knowingly kills a cow or bullock, the person shall be liable to impris-
onment for a term of 12 years, and a person who instigates for the same shall be 
imprisoned for a term of 6 years. A person who kills a yak (chauri) shall be liable 
to a fine of 40 Rupees for each yak.
12.  If a person administers poison to a cow or bullock with intention to kill it, the 
offender shall, despite that such an animal does not die, be liable to the punish-
ment of imprisonment for a term of 6 years; a person who instigates to adminis-
ter such poisoning shall be liable for the punishment of imprisonment for a term 
of 3 years; and a person who makes attempt for the same shall be liable to the 
punishment of imprisonment for a term of 2 years.
13.  If a person holds or fastens (bandhchhadh) a cow or bullock with intention to 
cause to kill it with the hand of other person, such an offender shall be liable to 
the punishment of imprisonment for a term of 6 years.
14.  Any person who causes a grievous hurt (angabhanga) to a cow or bullock shall be 
liable to the punishment of imprisonment for a term of 2 years; and any person 
who causes wound or bloodshed (ragatpachhe) to such an animal shall be liable 
to a fine of up to 200 Rupees. Any person who causes grievous hurt or wound or 
bloodshed to a yak shall be liable to a fine of up to 20 Rupees.
15.  Any person who hits a cow or bullock that belongs to another person and such an 
animal dies accidentally (bhabitabaya), the cost of such an animal shall be recov-
ered, and a fine equal to the cost of such a cow or bullock shall be imposed on 
such person. . . .
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18.  No person shall use a bullock or branded ox or cow to plough land. If any person 
ploughs with the help of such an animal, he or she shall be liable to a fine of up to 
Twenty Rupees and such an animal shall be set free.
19.  If a suit is not filed within 6 months in the case of killing of a cow (gobadh) and 
within 35 days on the matter of other offences, after the date of the cause of 
action, the suit shall not be entertained (my translation).
Similarly to the old Ain, the new Ain included criminal provisions to protect cattle 
other than the cow—ox, bullock, and yak—and to reflect the fact that they are also 
working animals. Provisions were also added to regulate the treatment of domestic 
animals other than cattle.6 Significantly, the code applied uniformly throughout the 
entire territory of Nepal, and no exceptions were made on the basis of community 
affiliation. In fact, the incident of Hindu-Muslim violence in Nepal during the 
Panchayat period occurred in 1971 in the Terai districts of Bara and Rautahat when “a 
Muslim accused of killing a cow was reportedly murdered by a Hindu from the same 
village, and riots lasting twelve days followed” (Adamson Sijapati 2011, 55). It is clear 
that cow protection by legal means played a pivotal role in the modern construction 
of Hindu Nepal during the Panchayat years and proved to be a resilient institution 
even after the redemocratization of 1990.
Nepal’s post–Cold War redemocratization (1990–2006)
As the Panchayat system grew progressively delegitimized, the underground political 
parties organized themselves and in 1990 launched a pro-democracy movement 
that succeeded in toppling the regime. A political compromise was eventually 
reached between King Birendra Shah and the agitating political parties. It entailed 
the promulgation of a new constitution based on the principles of constitutional 
monarchy and parliamentary democracy. The 1990 constitution, however, retained 
that constellation of symbolic provisions that defined the Nepali nation in ethno-
cultural terms—a sort of a modern-day adaptation of the concept of Hindu kingship. 
Significantly, article 27(2) made His Majesty “the symbol of Nepali nationality and 
unity of the Nepali people,” a provision that was not present even in the nationalist 
Panchayat constitution. The state was eventually declared Hindu like the monarchy, 
the cow remained the national animal, and saffron endured as the national color, 
reflecting the document’s emphasis on Hindu symbolism (Malagodi 2013, 127–79). 
More substantively, the right to religion under article 19 afforded protection only to 
religion “as handed down from ancient times” (sanātana dekhi caliāeko) and retained 
the ban on proselytizing.
During the drafting of the 1990 constitution, however, there was an intense debate 
over the adoption of secularism. The campaign for secularism, launched by the 
communist forces and the religious minorities, gained momentum in June but was 
met with strong opposition from Nepal’s Hindu nationalists, who were supported by 
their Indian counterpart. In fact, on August 11, Lal Krishna Advani, the leader of the 
Indian Hindu nationalist party Bharatiya Jatana Party (BJP), visited Nepal to pressure 
the government to retain the constitutional definition of the kingdom as Hindu. 
The argument put forward was that such a definition did not equate to making 
Nepal into a confessional state but simply preserved the longstanding tradition of 
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“unity in diversity” under the tolerant umbrella of Hinduism that has characterized 
Nepal since its inception (Whelpton et al. 1999, 315–16). This line of reasoning is 
also manifest in the claim of the Indian political parties and organizations of the 
Hindu Right that Hindutva is about nationalism and not religion, an astute way of 
circumventing the constitutional commitment to secularism by appropriating it 
(Cossman and Kapur 1999). The Indian Supreme Court validated this position, that 
Hindutva means “Indian culture” and not Hinduism, in the controversial judgment 
over the election of Hindu Right politicians in Maharashtra handed down in 1996.7
Nepal’s 1990 constitution, however, also featured a strong commitment to 
equality and nondiscrimination, clearly revealing the ideological tensions within 
the document itself. While recognizing the sociocultural diversity and plural nature 
of the country’s population, the new constitution allowed for affirmative action 
measures but did not adopt the “minority approach” featured in the Indian document 
(Malagodi 2010). In line with the democratic spirit of 1990, the provisions of the Ain 
concerning religious conversion were amended in 1991 to remove any reference to 
any specific religion. The revised section provides as follows:
1.  No one shall propagate any religion in such manner as to undermine the reli-
gion of others nor shall cause another to convert anyone to his or her religion. 
If a person attempts to do such an act, they shall be liable to imprisonment for a 
term of 3 years; if a person has already caused others to convert to another reli-
gion, they shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of 6 years. If such person is 
a foreign national, he or she shall also be deported from Nepal after they serve 
their sentence (my translation).
The criminalization of cow slaughter, however, remained unchanged in the Ain.
The issue of cow protection returned to the forefront of political engagement in 
March 1995 when the then minister for Health and Labour in the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Unified-Marxist Leninist) (UML) government, the Newar activist Padma Ratna 
Tuladhar, allegedly stated that the ban on cow slaughter violated the human rights 
of beef-eating minorities. During my interview with him, Tuladhar recounted the 
incident as follows:
In Bhara district, one human rights organization, HURON (Human Rights Organisa-
tion Nepal)—I was one of the founding members and Central Committee member—
held a convention. . . . When I spoke at the Convention I wanted to draw attention 
to the fact that after the 1990 movement, after the restoration of democracy, 
although there was also the restoration of human rights—but only basic human 
rights like civic and political rights—other rights, social, economic, and cultural 
rights, were not there. For instance, Nepal was again declared a Hindu kingdom 
and the cow was made the national animal. But Nepal is—you see—a country of 
diversity with so many cultures and religions—we have Christians, Muslims, and 
indigenous people who have to get beef. So I pointed out that those people should 
be able to exercise that right. I gave the example of Muslims or Tamang wanting to 
take beef. As a human rights activist I should say yes, they should have that right 
to take beef, although the constitution is there with the Hindu kingdom clause. 
I observed that it could have been amended. It was reported by the opposition’s 
political friends that Mr. Tuladhar as a minister spoke and said that cows should 
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be slaughtered. I never used any of these words, “to kill” or “to slaughter.” That 
made very big news and from all the corners—political, social, and religious—I was 
attacked and attacked. My head was priced for 50,000. One activist said that Mr. 
Tuladhar should be cut into pieces. So still we do have this kind of discrimination, 
although we can say that we have again restored democracy. Nepali people have 
become sovereign, we are all equal . . . but still.8
The minister’s comments were met with such violent protests and indignation 
from various Hindu groups across the country that the then Prime Minister Man 
Mohan Adhikari issued a public apology and reassured the public of the government’s 
full support to the cow’s special status in Nepal (Whelpton et al. 1999, 211).
The criminalization of cow slaughter appears to be a phenomenon predominantly 
dealt with at district court level.9 The only case on cow slaughter decided under the 
1990 constitution that I could find in the Nepāl Kanūn Patrika (NKP), the monthly Law 
Reporter in which the most important Supreme Court decisions are reported, was the 
Prem Bahadur Karki case.10 It was a criminal appeal from the lower court. The Supreme 
Court issued its verdict on December 13, 2002. The legal issue was identified as “use of 
poison and killing of an ox (goru māreko).” The court acquitted the defendant on the 
basis of the following arguments:
Because informant Nar Bahadur was unable to clearly state that the defendant 
had fed poison to the dead ox, because defendant Prem Bahadur Karki issued a 
statement refuting in Court and to the Authorized Officer the crime he had been 
charged with, because it was not possible to conduct a post-mortem on the corpse 
of the ox, because it was not possible to ascertain from the report of the National 
Technology Laboratory whether the death of the ox had taken place because he 
was fed the poison, because the eyewitness who reportedly saw the defendant feed-
ing poison to the ox, Laxmi Maya, was unable to give a fixed incriminating account 
of the defendant feeding the poison, because an individual non-specialized official 
of the Animal Service Center expressed the opinion that the ox died after being 
fed poison, because to punish and convict the defendant only on the basis of the 
autopsy report which the [Animal Service Centre] NAPRAS wrote stating that two 
ox had died because of poison—in a situation in which the prosecution was unable 
to submit any other evidence—would not be consistent with the recognized princi-
ples of criminal justice (phaujdārī nyāyako), therefore the accused must be given the 
benefit of the doubt (śankāko suvidhā) (my translation).
The defendant had been acquitted by the District Court of Morang and the 
Appellate Court in Biratnagar after being charged under Sections 1 and 11 of Muluki 
Ain’s chapter on quadrupeds. Interestingly, in this criminal law case the judges 
made no reference to the 1990 constitution, not even to article 6(2) on the cow as 
Nepal’s national animal or article 4(1) on the Hindu connotation of the kingdom. 
The judgment concentrated on the facts of the case and the principles of criminal 
procedure called into question, ignoring altogether the debate on the potentially 
discriminatory nature of the ban on cow slaughter.
The discontent about the 1990 settlement intensified in the mid-1990s. In 1996, 
the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched an armed insurgency to capture 
the Nepali state. The list of demands submitted to the government included the 
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promulgation of a new constitution drafted by the people’s elected representatives, 
the adoption of secularism, the end of discrimination on the basis of caste, ethnicity, 
and gender, and so on.11 The year 2001 represented a turning point in the civil 
war. The royal massacre took place leaving nine members of the royal family 
dead, including King Birendra and Queen Aishwarya. As a result, unpopular King 
Gyanendra ascended to the throne leading to a severe weakening of the position of 
the monarchy. In November of the same year, the first round of peace talks between 
the government and the Maoists collapsed, opening the road to the bloodiest phase 
of the conflict amid the deployment of the army and repeated bouts of emergency 
and autocratic monarchical rule. As it became apparent that the conflict could not be 
resolved by military means, in November 2005 a political deal was brokered in India 
to end the stalemate; the political parties agreed to the longstanding Maoist demand 
for the abrogation of the 1990 constitution and the promulgation of a new document 
drafted by a directly elected Constituent Assembly. In April 2006, a pro-democracy 
movement launched by the mainstream political parties and the Maoists succeeded 
in bringing to an end King Gyanendra’s autocracy.
Nepal’s peace process
Nepal’s peace process began in April 2006 and revolved around two main goals: the 
integration of the Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army and the election of the 
Constituent Assembly. The constitution-making process was characterized by the man- 
tra of social inclusion and was consequently expected to “build a New Nepal” through 
a radical program of state restructuring. In order to bring the Maoists into the fold 
and pave the way for the elections of the Constituent Assembly, it was agreed that an 
interim constitution would be drafted and the 1990 constitution abrogated. On May 
18, the interim parliament issued a proclamation curtailing the powers of the king 
and declaring Nepal secular, thus undercutting the monarchy’s legitimacy.
In January 2007, the interim constitution was promulgated. The document 
remained silent on the position of the monarchy but removed all the references 
to the notion of Hindu kingship. The right to religion under article 23, however, 
remained limited to religion “as handed down to him or her from ancient times,” 
retained the ban on proselytization, and introduced a ban on religious interference 
(“no person shall act or behave in a manner which may infringe upon the religion 
of others”). Significantly, the controversial expression sanātana was taken out of the 
article and substituted with the term “parāpurvā,” a neutral term that indicates “time 
immemorial” and is not specifically associated with Hinduism. Article 7 on national 
symbols retained crimson as the national color and the cow as the national animal, 
still reflecting the Hindu symbolism associated with political authority in Nepal.
Yash Ghai, at the time the UNDP advisor on Nepal’s constitution-making process, 
commented the following:
a state does not need a religion; and in the same way doesn’t need a national animal/
plant etc., and suggested that having, as in Nepal, the cow as the national animal 
was unnecessarily divisive. (UNDP/CASU 2007, 18)
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Maoist ideologue Baburam Bhattarai, during my interview with him, responded 
that retaining the cow as Nepal’s national animal in the interim constitution was 
the outcome of the negotiations behind the finalization of the document in which 
the Maoists sought to transform the country into a republic: “We took the King and 
we gave the cow.”12 Other political commentators, instead, argued that the Maoists 
relented on the issue of the cow because they feared that the majority of the Nepali 
public would have not supported the decision.
The emphasis on inclusion during the early years of the peace process is reflected 
in the attempts to reform Nepal’s legal system in order to amend civil and criminal 
law provisions that discriminate among Nepalis on the basis of religion, caste, 
ethnicity, language, gender, region, and so on. The international community in 
Kathmandu supported these initiatives and a number of reports were compiled on 
these issues. For instance, the trailblazing joint UK Department for International 
Development (DFID)–World Bank report Unequal Citizens treated the criminalization 
of cow slaughter as an example of discriminatory legal provisions, because Janajati, 
Dalit, Muslims, and other groups do not perceive cow slaughter to be a crime, and 
for many of these groups beef consumption is part of their cultural practices (World 
Bank 2006, 43). Significantly, the identity of the Adivasi Janajati (“Indigenous 
Nationalities”) groups has historically developed in opposition to the identity of 
the high-caste Hindus (Guneratne 2002, 89). Riding the wave of inclusion, in 2007 
a Janajati lawyer filed a public interest litigation petition in the Supreme Court 
seeking to have the criminalization of cow slaughter in the Muluki Ain declared 
unconstitutional on the basis that Nepal had become constitutionally secular. The 
apex court, however, upheld the validity of the ban on cow slaughter on the basis of 
the special constitutional recognition of the cow as Nepal’s national animal and the 
role of the cow as Hinduism’s sacred animal.13 The decision reveals how sensitive and 
embattled the issue of cow protection by legal means remains in Nepal.
In fact, the current struggles over the meaning of secularism in the country 
revolve around the protection of Nepal’s national identity through religious symbols. 
As Chiara Letizia (2012, 81) has clearly illustrated,
legal prohibitions against conversion and cow slaughter are the focal points around 
which the opposition to secularism is based. “Secularism,” for my Hindu interview-
ees, meant allowing proselytization and cow slaughter, the former understood as 
the unfair conversion of illiterate people who would be lured by economic advan-
tages (fueled by a “Christian conspiracy”) and the latter as non-Hindus assert-
ing their right to eat cows. The most recurrent argument was that secularism, 
because it gives religious minorities these rights, leads to disrespect and commu- 
nal violence.
Therefore, cow protection is framed as instrumental to the preservation of Nepal’s 
identity and social order through the imposition of the majority’s “appropriate” 
standards of behavior on “deviant” minority groups. Ultimately, the intervention 
of the law in the protection of the cow fulfills a dual function: on the one hand, it 
provides legitimacy to political authority through the modern ideological device of 
ethno-cultural nationalism; on the other hand, it reinforces the hierarchical nature 
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of Nepal’s status quo steeped in the exclusionary identity politics that has been 
promoted for centuries by the Nepali state.
The election of the first Constituent Assembly in April 2008 gave birth to Nepal’s 
most representative state body in the country’s history. The Maoists gained a 
relative majority, but no party controlled the Assembly. On May 28, in its first 
meeting the Constituent Assembly declared Nepal to be a republic. However, the 
political fragmentation of the body and the profound differences among the main 
political parties led to a political deadlock in the drafting of the new constitution. 
Notwithstanding four extensions of the Assembly’s term, in May 2012 the body was 
dissolved, leaving the constitution-making process incomplete, even if the various 
Thematic Committees had prepared extensive reports and drafts. Significantly, 
the constitution draft of the chapter on the preliminaries did not feature an article 
on national symbols, and the definition of religion as “handed down since ancient 
times” was removed from the article on the right to religion in line with the spirit of 
inclusion that was to inform the new dispensation.
Fresh elections for the second Constituent Assembly eventually took place in 
November 2013 and brought a relative majority to the old centrist political parties. 
With the dissolution of the first Assembly inclusionary reforms progressively fell off 
the political agenda of the government. Nepal’s climate of political stalemate led to 
what a number of commentators have described as “counter-revolution by stealth.” 
While the second Assembly agreed to pick up from where the first Assembly had left off 
in terms of constitution-making, it became clear that the profound differences among 
the key political actors were difficult to resolve, and little progress was made with 
regard to drafting. In the wake of the devastating earthquakes in April and May 2015, 
Nepal’s political elites vowed to “fast track” the drafting of the new constitution and 
complete the peace process. However, when the draft document was leaked to press 
in June amid increasingly violent protests, Seira Tamang pointedly commented that, 
“the now officially public draft constitution has confirmed the fears of many. It has 
veered from the sentiments of the 2006 Jana Andolan and the 2007 Madhes Move-
ment, retracted from the commitments of the interim Constitution and largely 
written-over the progressive drafts produced by the most-representative elected 
body in Nepal’s history—the first Constituent Assembly” (The Kathmandu Post 2015).
The change in Nepal’s political climate was also reflected in the Supreme 
Court’s change of attitude. In 2014, an activist Janajati lawyer filed another public 
interest litigation petitioning the Court to strike down the chapter on quadrupeds 
in the Muluki Ain on the basis that it conflicts with the constitutional provision on 
secularism and international law instruments to which Nepal is party. Compensation 
for those who are serving imprisonment and facing prosecution was also requested. 
In September, the single bench of Justice Govinda Kumar Upadhyaya issued an order 
to dismiss the petition in the case of Tekam Gharti v Minister of Law and Justice. 
In a joint urgent communication by the Lawyers’ Association for Human Rights of 
Nepalese Indigenous Peoples (LAHURNIP) and the National Coalition against Racial 
Discrimination (NCARD) to various UN Special Rapporteurs, the activist lawyers 
reported on the Tekam Gharti case as follows:
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Though the petition presented the context of increasing communal tensions in 
recent times due to prohibition on cow slaughter, the Supreme Court ordered dis-
missal of the petition on the grounds that the Special Bench had already decided 
on the issue [in the case of Om Prakash Aryal]. Of particular concern is that the order 
issued by the single bench of Honorable Justice Govinda Kumar Upadhyaya states 
that despite the legal provision of the existing Chapter on the Quadruped, all Nep-
alese including Hindus and non-Hindus have lived heartily as flowers of a single 
garden; in such situation, an order as demanded in the petition is highly likely to 
devastate the feelings of [the] Hindu community. Also as Court is not the place to 
resolve such [an] issue but the Legislature-Parliament, the writ petition was not 
seen to be eligible at the first sight.14
Arguably, the Supreme Court thereby indirectly closed its doors to future 
constitutional cases against the provision of cow slaughter (LAHURNIP 2015). At 
district court level (i.e., in first instance proceedings), LAHURNIP claimed that a 
clearly discriminatory pattern emerged in the application of the provisions of the 
Ain criminalizing cow slaughter. Of all the cases monitored between 2011 and 2014 all 
the defendants were Janajati, with the exception of three cases where the defendants 
were respectively Dalits, Muslims, and in only one case upper-caste Hindus.15
Unsurprisingly in this growing climate of intolerance, the new constitution 
promulgated on September 20, 2015 backtracked from its commitment to secularism 
in the 2007 interim constitution and in the reports of the first Constituent Assembly. 
While defining the state as secular in article 4, it contains an explanation stating 
that “for the purpose of this article, ‘secular’ means protection of religion and 
culture being practiced since ancient times, and religious and cultural freedom.” 
Significantly, the expression sanātana dekhi caliāeko was again inserted in the 
text, going back to a limited conception of religious freedom conflated within the 
privileged position of Hinduism understood as sanātana dharma. The new document 
also retained the Hindu symbolism of the cow as Nepal’s national animal and saffron 
as Nepal’s national color in article 9(3). Interestingly, the proposal was put forward 
for the rhino to become Nepal’s national animal as it is an endangered species, but 
the proposal was rebuffed (Himalayan News Service 2015). Article 26 on the right to 
religious freedom removed the reference to sanātana, which in any case had been 
shifted to article 4, and retained the constitutional ban on religious proselytism. With 
regard to religion, the 2015 constitution presents almost the identical framework of 
the embattled 1990 document.
Unsurprisingly, in this context the Penal Code of 2018 also retained the 
criminalization of cow and ox slaughter under section 289, which provides for a 
sentence of three-year imprisonment for killing a cow or an ox, and six months for 
mutilation.
Conclusions
The core argument put forward is that cow protection through legal means 
represents a useful prism to understand the approach deployed by the Nepali state 
to manage the profound sociocultural diversity of its people over the last two and 
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half centuries. These constitutional provisions have played a pivotal symbolic 
role in the construction of the Nepali nation over the centuries, but they also bore 
material implications for Nepal’s marginalized groups. The analysis has revealed 
that an ambivalent notion of “the sovereign” has emerged in post-conflict Nepal, a 
representation of political authority in which the king’s head has not yet been cut 
off. In Nepal, the transition from a notion of “sovereignty from above” centered 
on the divine notion of Hindu kingship and the subjugation of its subjects to a 
conception of “sovereignty from below” based on the consent of the people has 
remained incomplete. Cow protection has come to signify a vision of state authority 
that privileges the symbols of the majority over the rights of the minority. Two 
concluding remarks ensue: first, the fact that the majority of Nepal’s population is 
Hindu is a sociological fact that hardly needs reinforcing in the constitutional texts, if 
at all. Second, if in the context of constitutional democracy national symbols bear no 
legal implications as it is often argued, then they are redundant and would be better 
omitted in the interest of legal clarity and certainty; if instead they have material 
implications as this study has sought to demonstrate, then they should be inclusive.
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Notes
1. The 2011 Census in Nepal has identified that within the total population of 26.5 million there 
are 125 caste-ethnic groups (where the largest groups constitutes only 16.6 percent of the total 
population) alongside 123 languages and ten religions (Government of Nepal 2011).
2. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1535.
3. Article 25, Explanation 2, Constitution of India 1950; S. 2 Hindu Marriage Act 1955.
4. For instance, the incident in Dadhri (BBC 2015a), and the issues of cow slaughter in Kashmir 
(BBC 2015b).
5. ICS 125/B/xiii/2/iv.
6. The relevant provisions are as follows:
6.  Except the four-footed animals that are restricted to kill, no one shall kill or injure (khuni) 
any other pet animal, even if such an animal causes loss to one’s crops. One shall hand over 
such an animal to the police office, and the owner of crops shall be entitled to recover the 
loss (amount in question) from the owner of the animal. A person shall not get compensation 
for a loss of crops if he or she causes injury to the animal. If any animal, except a cow or ox, 
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is injured, one shall not be liable to punishment. If a person kills such an animal, the person 
shall pay compensation to the owner of the animal and shall also be liable to punishment.
7.  If it seems that a pet animal may cause loss or damage because it is excited or has gone mad or 
for any other reason, any damage or risk (jokhimi) that may be caused by such an animal shall 
be saved at any cost, and such an animal shall be kept safely from causing any loss to some 
other person. When the owner of such an animal keeps the animal safely, but some person 
dies due to strike, bite, or any other act by such an animal, the owner of such an animal shall 
be dealt with pursuant to the Act regarding bhabitabaya (accidental homicide). The animal 
that kills a person shall be confiscated and shall be cut and its meat shall be auctioned if 
people eat the meat of such an animal and if people do not eat such meat, the body of such an 
animal shall be buried. The cow, ox, or other animal that is restricted to be killed, shall be put 
in the nearest government cattle house (goth), stable (tabela), or elephant shed (hattisar) in 
such a way that it cannot cause any loss or damage, and information thereof shall be given to 
the concerned office accordingly. If any animal kills any of the family members of the owner 
or caretaker of such animal, it shall not be considered to be an offence. Such an animal shall 
be confiscated (jafat) as mentioned above. In cases where such an animal kills any animal of 
another person, other than a human being, the loss shall be recovered and penalty shall also 
be imposed as referred to in the Act. In cases where an animal such as an elephant or horse, 
etc., which is being used as a means of transportation causes any loss or damage, it shall be 
dealt with in accordance with the concerned law. . . .
17.  If a stray (chhada) animal or an animal under the care of a herd (gothala) causes a serious 
injury to a person or another animal due to the negligence on the part of the herd, the owner 
of animal in the case of a stray animal, and the herd, if he or she is sane and has crossed the 
age of 16 years, and the owner of the animal, if the herd is below the age of 16 years, shall be 
liable to a fine of up to 20 Rupees.
7. Manohar Joshi v Nitin Bhaurao Patel AIR 1996 SC 796.
8. Interview with Padma Ratna Tuladhar, Kathmandu, April 12, 2007.
9. For instance, the Kripa Bhoteni case received great attention from the international media. 
On April 3, 2006, the District Court of Sankuvasabha in Western Nepal sentenced the fifty-year-
old woman to twelve years of imprisonment for slaughtering a three-year-old cow for meat 
consumption (see BBC News 2006).
10.  HMG/N v. Prem Bahadur Karki, NKP, 2059/2002, Vol. 44, N. 9/10, p. 697.
11. The list of the forty-point demands put forward by the Maoists is available at https://www 
.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/40points.htm (accessed March 29, 
2021).
12. Interview with Baburam Bhattarai, Kathmandu, August 16, 2010.
13. Omprakash Aryal v Prime Minister, NKP, 2008, Vol. 9, p. 1063.
14. LAHURNIP and NCARD joint communication concerning violations of rights to freedom 
of religion or belief and cultural rights of indigenous peoples in Nepal (2015). While this was 
originally available online at http://www.ncard.org.np/categoryFiles/1426983443nepal_cow_
slaughter_communication_2015.pdf (accessed January 10, 2016), unfortunately as at April 2021 
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the file is no longer available online. Please contact the author directly for access to a copy of this 
resource.
15. For a sample of prosecutions for cow slaughter in Nepal in 2012–13 see: Indigenous Issues in 
Asia, December 16, 2013.
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